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Abstract. Perfectly rational decision-makers maximize expected util-
ity, but crucially ignore the resource costs incurred when determining
optimal actions. Here we propose an axiomatic framework for bounded
rational decision-making based on a thermodynamic interpretation of
resource costs as information costs. We show that this axiomatic frame-
work enforces a unique conversion law between utility and information,
which can be characterized by a variational “free utility” principle akin
to thermodynamical free energy. This variational principle constitutes a
normative criterion that trades off utility and information costs, the lat-
ter measured by the Kullback-Leibler deviation between a distribution
representing a desired policy and a reference distribution representing an
initial default policy. We show that bounded optimal control solutions
can be derived from this variational principle, which leads in general to
stochastic policies. Furthermore, we show that risk-sensitive and robust
(minimax) control schemes fall out naturally from this framework if the
environment is considered as an adversarial opponent. When resource
costs are ignored, the maximum expected utility principle is recovered.
1 Introduction
Rational decision-making is usually based on the principle of maximum expected
utility (MEU) [17]. According to MEU, a rational agent chooses its action a so as
to maximize its expected utility E[U|a] =
∑
sP(s|a)U(s) given the probability
P(s|a) that action a ∈ A will lead to outcome s ∈ S and given that the desirabil-
ity of the outcome s is measured by the utilityU(s) ∈ R. Thus, expected utilities
express betting preferences over lotteries with uncertain outcomes. The optimal
action a∗ ∈ A is defined as the one that maximizes the expected utility, that is
a∗ := argmaxaE[U|a]. However, computing such optimal actions is often very
difficult in practice due to prohibitive resource costs that are associated with the
process of finding the optimal action. Such resource costs are ignored by MEU.
In contrast, a bounded rational decision-maker has only limited resources
and cannot afford an unlimited search for the optimal action [11]. Therefore,
such decision-makers have to trade off the utility that an action achieves against
the resource cost of finding the action. Imagine, for example, you want to invest
⋆ A shortened version of this paper has been published in Lecture Notes on Artificial
Intelligence 6830, pp. 269–274.
2 Bounded Rationality
some of your savings and you start reading up on several options, asking your
local bank, etc. However, as a bounded agent in the real world you cannot extend
this search forever, as you will loose out in the meanwhile. Therefore, you have
to trade off somehow the time invested in this search and a satisfactory return
from some investment option.
In this paper we propose an axiomatic formalization of bounded rationality
that leads to such a trade-off based on a thermodynamic interpretation of re-
source costs [4]. The intuition behind this interpretation is that ultimately any
real decision-maker has to be incarnated in a physical system, since any process
of information processing must always be accompanied by a pertinent physical
process [15]. Thermodynamics provides the tools to study these general physical
systems. In Section 2 we discuss the thermodynamical notion of resource costs in
information processing systems. In Section 3 we show how a set of simple choice
axioms leads to a variational principle that allows computing bounded optimal
policies in systems with resource costs. In Section 4 we apply this framework
and show how to derive bounded optimal solutions for decision-making under
resource costs in different environments. We also show how to obtain classic
maximum expected utility solutions in the limit of negligible resource costs.
2 Resource Costs
In the following we conceive of information processing as changes in information
states, i.e. ultimately changes of probability distributions that are represented
in physical systems. Changing an information state therefore implies changes
in physical states, such as flipping gates in a transistor, changing voltage on a
microchip, or even changing location of a gas particle. Changing such states is
costly and requires thermodynamical work [4]. Imagine, for example, that we use
an ideal gas particle in a box with volume Vi as an information processing system
to represent a uniform probability density over a random variable with pi =
1
Vi
.
If we now want to update this probability to pf , because we gained information
− log p = − log pi
pf
> 0, we have to reduce the original volume to Vf = pVi. How-
ever, this decrease in volume requires the workW = −
∫ Vf
Vi
NkT
V
dV = NkT ln Vi
Vf
,
where N is the number of gas molecules, k is the Boltzmann constant, and T is
temperature. Thus, in this simple example we can compute the relation between
the change in information state and the required work, that is W = −α log p,
with α = kTlog e > 0 being the conversion factor between information and energy.
The conversion factor α depends on the underlying properties of the physical
system and determines how expensive it is to process information. In the next
two sections, we derive a general expression of information costs for physical
systems that represent bounded rational decision-makers. Since such decision-
makers need to trade off utility and information costs, we will first investigate
the relation between information and utility [10] and then show how informa-
tion costs appear as an additional term in the utility in physically implemented
decision-makers.
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3 Conversion between utility and information
3.1 Choice axioms
Consider a decision-maker whose behavior is represented by a probability space
(Ω,F ,P) with sample set Ω and σ-algebra F of measurable events between
which the decision-maker can choose. We assume that the decision-maker can
choose freely any probability measureP representing his choice behavior. Thus, if
P(A) > P(B), then the propensity of choosing A is higher than that of choosing
B. This difference in probability can be given a utilitarian interpretation: A
is chosen with higher probability than B because A is more desirable than B.
The measure that quantifies such differences in desirability is commonly called
a utility function. If there is such a measure, then it is reasonable to demand
the following properties:
i. Utilities should be mappings from events into real numbers.
ii. Absolute values of utility are irrelevant, only relative differences in utility
should matter (“utility gains”).
iii. Utility gains should be additive.
iv. A decision-maker should assign more probability mass to events with high
utility and less probability mass to events with low utility.
v. An adversarial agent should make the reverse assignment of probability mass.
These postulates are summarized in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Axioms of Choice). Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space. A set
function U : F → R is a utility function for a decision-maker with probability
measure P iff its utility gain function u(A|B) := U(A ∩ B)−U(B) has the
following three properties for all events A,B,C,D ∈ F :
A1. ∃f,u(A|B) = f
(
P(A|B)
)
∈ R, (real-valued)
A2. u(A ∩B|C) = u(A|C) + u(B|A ∩ C), (additive)
A3. P(A|B) > P(C|D) ⇔ u(A|B) > u(C|D). (monotonic increasing)
If the decision-maker is an adversarial opponent, the inequality of A3 is reversed
A4. P(A|B) > P(C|D) ⇔ u(A|B) < u(C|D). (monotonic decreasing)
Furthermore, we use the abbreviation u(A) := u(A|Ω).
The following theorem shows that these three properties enforce a strict
mapping between probabilities and utility gains.
Theorem 1 (Utility Gain ↔ Probability). If f is such that u(A|B) =
f(P(A|B)) for any probability space (Ω,F ,P), then f is of the form
f(·) = α log(·),
where α is an arbitrary strictly positive constant in case of A3 or an arbitrary
strictly negative constant in case of A4.
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The proof is provided elsewhere [10,8]. If one is willing to accept Definition 1,
then one obtains the relations
U(A ∩B)−U(B) = α logP(A|B). (1)
In this relation, α plays the role of a conversion factor between utilities and infor-
mation. A bounded rational decision-maker is characterized by α > 0, whereas
an adversarial opponent can be described by α < 0. Unless otherwise stated,
we will assume α > 0 in the following. If a probability measure P and a utility
function U satisfy the relation (1), then we say that they are conjugate. Given
that this transformation between utility gains and probabilities is a bijection,
one can rewrite any probability P(A|B) as a Gibbs measure:
P(A|B) =
∑
ω∈A∩B exp
1
α
U(ω)∑
ω∈B exp
1
α
U(ω)
. (2)
where we have used the abbreviation U(ω) := U({ω}). This transformation
implies that the probability measure P is the Gibbs measure with temperature
α and energy levels e(ω) := −U({ω}). As the conversion factor α approaches
zero, the probability measure P(ω) approaches a delta function δω∗(ω) with
ω∗ = argmaxωU(ω), or in case of several maxima the uniform distribution over
the maximal set Ωmax := {ω
∗ ∈ Ω|ω∗ = argmaxωU(ω)} . Similarly, as α→∞,
P(ω)→ 1|Ω| , i.e. the uniform distribution over the whole outcome set Ω.
3.2 Variational principle
It is well known in statistical physics that the Gibbs measure satisfies a vari-
ational problem in the free energy [3]. Since utilities correspond to negative
energies, we can formulate a free utility principle that is maximized by a decision-
maker that acts according to (2).
Theorem 2. Let X be a random variable with values in X . Let P and U be
a conjugate pair of probability measure and utility function over X. Define the
free utility functional as
J(Pr;U) :=
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)U(x) − α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) logPr(x),
where Pr is an arbitrary probability measure over X. Then,
J(Pr;U) ≤ J(P;U) = U(Ω).
A proof can be found in [7]. The free utility is a combined measure of a system’s
expected utility and its uncertainty. The variational principle implies that the
Gibbs measure P maximizes the free utility for a given utility function U, as
P = argmaxPr J(Pr;U).
The variational principle of the free utility also allows measuring the cost of
transforming the state of a stochastic system required for information processing.
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Consider an initial system having probability measure Pi and utility function
Ui. This system satisfies the equation
Ji :=
∑
x∈X
Pi(x)Ui(x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pi(x) logPi(x) = Ui(Ω).
If we add new constraints represented by the utility function U∗ then the re-
sulting utility function Uf is given by the sum
Uf = Ui +U∗,
and the resulting probability measure Pf maximizes
J(Pr,Uf ) =
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)Uf (x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) logPr(x)
=
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)(Ui(x) +U∗(x))− α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) logPr(x)
=
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)U∗(x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) log
Pr(x)
Pi(x)
+Ui(Ω).
Let Jf := J(Pf ,Uf ). The difference in free utility is
Jf − Ji =
∑
x∈X
Pf (x)U∗(x) − α
∑
x∈X
Pf (x) log
Pf (x)
Pi(x)
. (3)
In physical systems with constant α, this difference measures the amount of
work necessary to change the state of the system from state i to state f . The
first term of the equation measures the expected utility difference U∗(x), while
the second term measures the information cost of transforming the probability
distribution from state i to state f . These two terms can be interpreted as deter-
minants of bounded rational decision-making in that they formalize a trade-off
between an expected utility U∗ (first term) and the information cost of trans-
forming Pi into Pf (second term). In this interpretation Pi represents an initial
probability or policy, which includes the special case of the uniform distribution
where the decision-maker has initially no preferences. Deviations from this ini-
tial probability incur an information cost measured by the KL divergence. If this
deviation is bounded by a non-zero value, we have a bounded rational agent.
In thermodynamics there are two dominant formulations of the second law
that allow determining the equilibrium distribution: the first and maybe more fa-
miliar formulation is the principle of maximum entropy, and the second principle
is the principle of minimum energy [3]. The corresponding variational problems
are typically formulated such that in the case of maximum entropy we hold
the mean energy fixed (i.e. in our case the expected utility), and in the case of
minimum energy (i.e. in our case maximum utility) we hold the entropy fixed.
Mathematically, the constraints of fixed entropy and fixed utility are added by
Lagrange multipliers. In our context with respect to equation 3 this leads to two
different variational principles:
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1. Control. The minimum energy principle translates into a bounded maxi-
mum utility principle. Given an initial policy represented by the probability
measure Pi and the constraint utilities U∗, we are looking for the final sys-
tem Pf that optimizes the trade-off between utility and resource costs. That
is,
Pf = argmax
Pr
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)U∗(x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) log
Pr(x)
Pi(x)
. (4)
The solution is given by
Pf (x) ∝ Pi(x) exp
(
1
α
U∗(x)
)
.
In particular, at very low temperature α ≈ 0, (3) becomes
Jf − Ji ≈
∑
x∈X
Pf (x)U∗(x),
and hence resource costs are ignored in the choice of Pf , leading to Pf ≈
δx∗(x), where x
∗ = maxxU∗(x). Similarly, at a high temperature, the dif-
ference is
Jf − Ji ≈ −α
∑
x∈X
Pf (x) log
Pf (x)
Pi(x)
,
and hence only resource costs matter, leading to Pf ≈ Pi.
2. Estimation. The maximum entropy principle translates into a minimum
relative entropy principle for estimation. Given a final probability measure
Pf that represents the environment and the constraint utilities U∗, we are
looking for the initial system Pi that satisfies
Pi = argmax
Pr
∑
x∈X
Pf (x)U∗(x)− α
∑
x∈X
Pf (x) log
Pf (x)
Pr(x)
(5)
= argmin
Pr
∑
x∈X
Pf (x) log
Pf (x)
Pr(x)
,
and thus we have recovered the minimum relative entropy principle for esti-
mation, having the solution
Pi = Pf .
The minimum relative entropy principle for estimation is well-known in the lit-
erature as it underlies Bayesian inference [5], but the same principle can also
be applied to problems of adaptive control [9]. In the following we focus on
applications of the first principle on bounded optimal control.
4 Applications
Consider a system that first emits an action symbol x1 with probability P0(x1)
and then expects a subsequent input signal x2 with probability P0(x2|x1). Now
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we impose a utility on this decision-maker that is given by U(x1) for the first
symbol and U(x2|x1) for the second symbol. How should this system adjust
its action probability P (x1) and expectation P (x2|x1)? Given the boundedness
constraints c1 and c2 on the relative entropies, the variational problem is given
by
max
p(x1)p(x2|x1)
∑
x1
p(x1)U(x1)− α
(∑
x1
p(x1) log
p(x1)
p0(x1)
− c1
)
+
∑
x1,x2
p(x1)p(x2|x1)U(x2|x1)
− β
(∑
x1,x2
p(x1)p(x2|x1) log
p(x2|x1)
p0(x2|x1)
− c2
)
,
with α and β as Lagrange multipliers. We can rewrite this sum as a nested
expression and drop all constants
max
p(x1)p(x2|x1)
∑
x1
p(x1)
[
U(x1)− α log
p(x1)
p0(x1)
+
∑
x2
p(x2|x1)
[
U(x2|x1)− β log
p(x2|x1)
p0(x2|x1)
]]
.
We have then an inner variational problem:
max
p(x2|x1)
∑
x2
p(x2|x1)
[
−β log
p(x2|x1)
p0(x2|x1)
+ U(x2|x1)
]
(6)
with the solution
p(x2|x1) =
1
Z2
p0(x2|x1) exp
(
1
β
U(x2|x1)
)
(7)
and the x1-dependent normalization constant
Z2 =
∑
x2
p0(x2|x1) exp
(
1
β
U(x2|x1)
)
and an outer variational problem
max
p(x1)
∑
x1
p(x1)
[
−α log
p(x1)
p0(x1)
+ U(x1) + β logZ2
]
(8)
with the solution
p(x1) =
1
Z1
p0(x1) exp
(
1
α
(U(x1) + β logZ2)
)
(9)
=
1
Z1
p0(x1) exp
(
1
α
(
U(x1) + β log
∑
x2
p0(x2|x1) exp
(
1
β
U(x2|x1)
)))
and the normalization constant
Z1 =
∑
x1
p0(x1) exp
(
1
α
(U(x1) + β logZ2)
)
=
∑
x1
p0(x1) exp
(
1
α
(
U(x1) + β log
∑
x2
p0(x2|x1) exp
(
1
β
U(x2|x1)
)))
.
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For notational convenience we introduce λ = 1
α
and µ = 1
β
. Depending on the
values of λ and µ we can discern the following cases:
1. Risk-seeking bounded rational agent: λ > 0 and µ > 0
When λ > 0 the agent is bounded and acts in general stochastically. When
µ > 0 the agent considers the move of the environment as if it was his own
move (hence “risk-seeking” due to the overtly optimistic view). This follows
immediately from the choice axioms presented in section 3.1. We can also see
this from the relationship between Z1 and Z2 in (9), if we assume µ = λ and
introduce the value function Vt =
1
λ
logZt, which results in the recursion
Vt−1 =
1
λ
log
∑
xt−1
P0(xt−1|·) exp (λ (U(xt−1|·) + Vt)) .
Similar recursions based on the log-transform have been previously exploited
for efficient approximations of optimal control solutions both in the discrete
and the continuous domain [2,6,14]. In the perfectly rational limit λ→ +∞,
this recursion becomes the well-known Bellman recursion
V ∗t−1 = max
xt−1
(U(xt−1|·) + V
∗
t )
with V ∗t = limλ→+∞ Vt.
2. Risk-neutral perfectly rational agent: λ→ +∞ and µ→ 0
This is the limit for the standard optimal controller. We can see this from
(9) by noting that
lim
µ→0
1
µ
log
∑
x2
p0(x2|x1) exp (µU(x2|x1)) =
∑
x2
p0(x2|x1)U(x2|x1),
which is simply the expected utility. By setting U(x1) ≡ 0, and taking the
limit λ→ +∞ in (9), we therefore obtain an expected utility maximizer
p(x1) = δ(x1 − x
∗
1)
with
x∗1 = argmax
x1
∑
x2
p0(x2|x1)U(x2|x1).
As discussed previously, action selection becomes deterministic in the per-
fectly rational limit.
3. Risk-averse perfectly rational agent: λ→ +∞ and µ < 0
When µ < 0 the decision-maker assumes a pessimistic view with respect
to the environment, as if the environment was an adversarial or malevolent
agent. This attitude is sometimes called risk-aversion, because such agents
act particularly cautiously to avoid high uncertainty. We can see this from
(9) by writing a Taylor series expansion for small µ
1
µ
log
∑
x2
p0(x2|x1) exp (µU(x2|x1)) ≈ E[U ]−
µ
2
VAR[U ],
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where higher than second order cumulants have been neglected. The name
risk-sensitivity then stems from the fact that variability or uncertainty in
the utility of the Taylor series is subtracted from the expected utility. This
utility function is typically assumed in risk-sensitive control schemes in the
literature [18], whereas here it falls out naturally. The perfectly rational actor
with risk-sensitivity µ picks the action
p(x1) = δ(x1 − x
∗
1)
with
x∗1 = argmax
x1
1
µ
log
∑
x2
p0(x2|x1) exp (µU(x2|x1)) ,
which can be derived from (9) by setting U(x1) ≡ 0 and by taking the limit
λ→ +∞. Within the framework proposed in this paper we might also inter-
pret the equations such that the decision-maker considers the environment
as an adversarial opponent with bounded rationality µ.
4. Robust perfectly rational agent: λ→ +∞ and µ→ −∞
When µ → −∞ the decision-maker makes a worst case assumption about
the adversarial environment, namely that it is also perfectly rational. This
leads to the well-known game-theoretic minimax problem with the solution
x∗1 = argmax
x1
argmin
x2
U(x2|x1),
which can be derived from (9) by setting U(x1) ≡ 0, taking the limits λ →
+∞ and µ→ −∞ and by noting that p(x1) = δ(x1−x
∗
1). Minimax problems
have been used to reformulate robust control problems that allow controllers
to cope with model uncertainties [1]. Robust control problems are also known
to be related to risk-sensitive control [1]. Here we derived both control types
from the same variational principle.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a thermodynamic interpretation of bounded ra-
tionality based on a free utility principle. Accordingly, bounded rational agents
trade off utility maximization against resource costs measured by the KL di-
vergence with respect to an initial policy. The use of the KL divergence as a
cost function for control has been previously proposed to measure deviations
from passive dynamics in Markov systems [13,14]. Other methods of statisti-
cal physics have been previously proposed as an information-theoretic approach
to interactive learning [12] and to game theory with bounded rational players
[19]. The contribution of our study is to devise a single axiomatic framework
that allows for the treatment of control problems, game-theoretic problems and
estimation and learning problems for perfectly rational and bounded rational
agents. In the future it will be interesting to relate the thermodynamic resource
costs of bounded rational agents to more traditional notions of resource costs
in computer science like space and time requirements when computing optimal
actions [16].
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